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Fighting the Defensive Battle 
on the Jamestown Line 
The Canadians in Korea, November 1951 
David J. Berenson 
B arbed wire. Artillery duels. Patrolling in "no-man's-land."' Static warfare from fixed 
defensive positions. This description could 
easily fit the western front in 1916. ln fact, 
however, it also depicts the Jamestown Line in 
central Korea from the beginning of the static 
phase of the Korean war in late October 1951 
to the cease-fire of July 1953. The apparent 
similarity of this static war to the Western Front 
from late 1914 to early 1918 has obscured the 
importance and uniqueness of the Korean 
experience to recent military history. For while 
stalemate on the Western Front derived from 
fundamental military problems, the stalemate 
in Korea was profoundly political in nature. 
When the Panmunjom phase of the Korean 
armistice talks began on 25 October 1951, 
political limits to further military action in Korea 
were established. From then on, neither side 
would fight for outright victory. Indeed, both 
sides would maneuver for favourable position 
along a more or less pre-determined line of 
contact, and at a cost of thousands of lives. 1 In 
contrast to the situation prevailing on the 
Western Front in World War One, it imposed 
strict limits on what could, and could not be 
done in operations against the enemy. In 
essence, because of the intrusion of Cold War 
politics, the Korean war was Canada's (and the 
world's) first post-Hiroshima war, and it set 
much of the pattern for the wars that followed. 
By far the most important limit was that 
restricting offensive operations. In his memoirs, 
Matthew B. Ridgeway. Supreme Commander of 
United Nations Forces in Korea in the late fall of 
1951, explained the ground rules he laid down 
to Eighth Army Commander James Van Fleet: 
With the resumption of truce negotiations. I 
instructed Van Fleet to assume an active defense, 
giving him authority to seize suitable terrain 
along the general trace of his present lines. but 
limiting offensive operations to the taking of 
outpost positions requiring commitment of no 
more than one division." 
Here, then, was another major difference 
between this phase of the Korean War and 
operations on the Western Front. Whereas the 
Western Allies launched major offensives from 
1916 on to re-establish maneuverwarfare,:3 the 
UN Command in Korea sought only the limited 
objective of holding or improving ground. 
Ridgeway's decision was directly related to 
the political necessity of keeping the Korean War 
from becoming World War Three, and the limits 
flowed from numerous policy directives issued 
from Washington. Stalemate was the 
operationalization of US President Harry 
Truman's determination to avoid a wider war. 
But it imposed serious limitations at the front 
where Corps and Divisional commanders were 
severely restricted in their ability to cope with 
continuous Communist attacks. At the battalion, 
company and platoon levels, it meant learning 
the art of active defence against an enemy 
unconstrained by public opinion in how many 
casualties he might suffer. For the Canadian 
army in particular, the testing came early, in 
November 1951, when it was forced to shoulder 
a disproportionate share of the defence of 1st 
Commonwealth Division's portion of the 
Jamestown Line. In doing so, it suffered 37 
killed in action and 126 wounded, missing or 
taken prisoner. Those numbers represented 
some 12 per cent of Canada's battle deaths in 
the entire Korean war and 10 per cent of its 
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Canadian soldiers move up the line in Korea. CF Photo SF-83( 
battle casualties in one month, or about 2.5 
times the average Canadian army monthly 
casualty rate in Korea. 4 
The Problem of Defence 
By the beginning of November, 1951 I Corps of the US Eighth Army had completed its 
five division push to what was to become the 
last UN defensive line in Korea- the Jamestown 
Line. First Commonwealth Division held some 
12000 metres affront between 1st US Cavalry 
Division on the right and First ROK Division to 
the left. The Commonwealth Division, 
commanded by British Major-General A.H. 
Cassels, consisted of British, Canadian, 
Australian, and New Zealand combat troops. 
8 
The Canadian portion of the Division was 
supposed to have amounted to one third- one 
of three brigades. But the 28th British and the 
29th Commonwealth Brigades were under-
strength so Canada's 25th Infantry Brigade was 
contributing three of the seven line battalions. 
In addition, each Canadian battalion had all four 
rifle companies up. 5 That amounted to about 
half of the line infantry and almost two-thirds 
of the Divisional front. 6 The Division was so 
dependent on Canadian rifle strength that when 
2 PPCLI began its rotation home in late October, 
to be replaced by 1 PPCLI, the changeover was 
done in situ, a highly risky operation. In the 
initial stages of that rotation, two companies 
from 1 PPCLI ("A" and "D") entered the line 
alongside 2 PPCLI's "A" Company, which was 
not due for rotation until 11 November. 7 
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The three Canadian battalions in the line at 
the start of November 1951 were 2 Royal 
Canadian Regiment, 2 Royal 22e Regiment, and 
three companies of both 1 and 2 Princess 
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. They were 
directly supported by the 25-pounder gun/ 
howitzers of 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery 
and the 76 mm-armed Sherman tanks of "C" 
Squadron. Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal 
Canadians). They held about 9000 metres of 
north-south front roughly along a 100 metre 
contour line. The land dropped suddenly some 
75 metres in front of their positions to a small 
stream flowing south to the Sami-chon. The 
Sami-chon fed into the Imjin River about 5 
kilometres further south. The dominant peak 
in the region was Hill 355. dubbed "Little 
Gibraltar" by US troops. The highest feature in 
the UN lines west of the Imjin, 355 towered over 
the surrounding hills. It and Hill 227. 1500 
metres due west. were then held by the 1st 
Battalion. the King's Shropshire Light Infantry 
[ 1KSLIJ of the 28th British Infantry Brigade. 
The Canadians faced the 568th and 570th 
Regiments of the 190th Division of the Chinese 
Communist 64th Army. Although the Chinese 
troops suffered many hardships compared to 
the UN forces, H they were by then far better 
equipped than their compatriots who had 
suddenly appeared out of the mountains of 
North Korea a year before. 9 Liberally supplied 
by the Soviet Union, the Chinese infantry were 
now supported by numerous direct and indirect 
fire weapons, Katyusha batteries, self-propelled 
guns, and large numbers of mortars all well dug-
in to the northwest of the Canadian positions. 
The evolution of the equipment mix of the 
Chinese troops was reflected in the nature of 
Canadian battle casualties. Some 52 per cent 
of all Canadian casualties reported up to 
December 1951, were caused by fragment 
wounds; only 33 per cent were due to small arms 
fire or automatic weapons. The Canadian 
Operational Research Team called the mortar 
"the commanding weapon" at that stage of the 
war. 10 
Hill 355 viewedJrom behind the CanadianJront line. The tank visible in the bottom right comer 
is located to provide Jire support and guard against any attempts to outjiank the position. 
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Ridgeway's decision to go over to the 
defensive ought to have dictated thorough 
preparation of defensive positions and 
aggressive tactics aimed at denying the initiative 
to the enemy, but that did not happen on the 
Commonwealth Division front. The problem 
began at Division HQ which never established 
or enforced a standard defence doctrine so that 
each battalion developed its defensive locality 
according to a single plan. That failure was 
compounded by shortages of materials for 
bunkers, trenches and dugouts, uncertainty 
produced by the armistice negotiations, and the 
sheer ignorance of many junior officers in the 
matter of selecting ground for defence. The static 
nature of the war discouraged initiative; 
battalions, companies, and platoons rotating 
into front line positions usually just occupied 
the defences already there, with only minor 
repair work and little improvement.'' 
The defences themselves were largely 
patterned after those the Canadians had used 
in Italy in World War II. Rifle companies were 
positioned on hilltops along the front in 
positions encircled by a minefield, a single row 
of concertina wire, and a single circular main 
trench. Fire trenches radiated outward from the 
main trench. Platoons were usually positioned 
at the corners of these defensive localities in 
order to engage the enemy in defilade. The 
valleys between the hilltop positions were strung 
with wire and sown with mines. On the high 
ground to the rear powerful searchlights were 
sited so as to illuminate enemy troops trying to 
infiltrate between defensive localities. 12 There 
was much dead ground on the lower slopes 
however, while the minefields surrounding the 
hilltops had only one gap to allow access and 
egress for purposes of patrolling. Given the 
roughness and the hilly nature of the terrain, 
the platoon positions were often sited too far 
forward to be of much help to the other platoons 
and were easily isolated by the attacking enemy 
who usually went after them in company 
strength.':1 
There was also no defence-in-depth for these 
hilltop fortresses, either from other defensive 
localities close by, or to the rear - from the 
Wyoming Line, some eight kilometres back or 
from the Kansas Line, about 12 kilometres 
further back from the Wyoming Line. The 
Wyoming Line was intended as the UN's first 
10 
Main Line of Resistance should the enemy 
penetrate the Jamestown Line, the Kansas Line 
was to be the second. There was, then, virtually 
no chance that troops along the Jamestown Line 
could count on heavy fire support from the rear, 
except for rare occasions when Corps medium 
artillery could be brought to bear. To compound 
the difficulty of defence on the Jamestown Line, 
bad weather often made supply and 
reinforcement routes from the rear almost 
impassable. 14 
In World War Two Canadians had come to 
count heavily on their artillery. The system by 
which Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) 
could call down "Mike," '"Uncle'" or "Victor" 
targets had allowed them to devastate 
concentrations of German troops when spotted 
forming up for attack. When an FOO called for 
a Victor target, all 216 field guns of an entire 
Corps zeroed on the same coordinates. With a 
good rate of fire, literally a thousand shells or 
so could devastate a German position inside of 
a minute. 15 The same effectiveness was also 
possible in the attack, of course. In Korea, 
however, the placement of the field artillery 
behind a strung out front line rendered it almost 
incapable of delivering concentrations of that 
magnitude; the best that could be done under 
even the most dire conditions was a three 
regiment "Uncle" concentration of 72 guns.lli 
The type of rough and ready defensive 
positions used in Korea had sufficed for the 
Canadians during the earlier Italian campaign; 
the Germans after all, had been defeated there. 
Thus Italy seemed to offer lessons for Korea 
because the terrain was somewhat similar and 
infantry dominated the battle. What appears to 
have been lost to the Commonwealth Division, 
and to the Canadian Brigade, is that there was 
a significant strategic difference between Italy 
and Korea. In Italy, the Germans were on the 
defensive, engaged in a fighting withdrawal to 
the north. When they were not withdrawing, they 
were engaging in active defence along well 
fortified lines such as the Winter or Gothic Lines. 
The Canadians, like the other Allies, were on 
the strategic offensive in Italy. The victory they 
sought could only come from successful 
advances. So even when fighting tended to 
slacken in the Italian winter, the Canadians and 
their allies still had no real need of a defence-
in-depth. Indeed, construction of such a defence 
4
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A 76 mm armed Sherman tank of the Lord Strathcona's Horse. 
could have undermined an offensive spirit 
among the soldiers and precipitated a garrison 
mentality Y None of that applied in Korea. 
The Canadian defences on the Jamestown 
Line received their first serious test on 2 
November 1951. 18 Large numbers of Chinese 
in fan try were seen massing across the valley 
from the 2 RCR positions at about 1300 hours. 
The Brigade artillery opened up with all 24 guns 
at 1520 hours but the Chinese continued to 
assemble on reverse slopes and in dead ground. 
At about 1800 hours Chinese howitzers opened 
up on the forward slope of the RCR's "A" 
Company while Chinese high velocity shells 
struck inside the "A" Company perimeter. The 
Chinese infantry, supported by from four to eight 
heavy machine guns firing from across the valley, 
moved up two hours later. With bugles and 
whistles blowing in the night, one company of 
Chinese infantry hit "A" Company, tried to 
penetrate between "A" and "C" Companies (about 
250 metres to the north), then attacked "C" 
Company itself. It was followed in close order 
by two more companies. 
These Chinese attacks, and the ones that 
followed throughout the night, were of a pattern. 
Chinese artillery landing to the front and sides 
of the Canadian positions forced the Canadians 
to keep their heads down while Chinese infantry 
with bangalore torpedoes blew gaps in the 
Canadian wire. Some Chinese cut the wire with 
hatchets. Still others, with thick padding on 
their coats, threw themselves over it to form 
human bridges for those behind. Once inside 
the wire, the Chinese tried to get into the 
trenches and firing pits. Canadian artillery and 
4.2-inch mortars kept up a steady fire on the 
enemy forming-up positions, but this did not 
remedy the problem caused by those Chinese 
already on top of the Canadian positions. At 
0200 hours some 15 Chinese were reported 
inside the wire of No.1 Platoon even though their 
own artillery continued to pound the Canadians. 
No.1 Platoon held out for an hour, then pulled 
back to the main company position closely 
followed by two companies of Chinese. Within 
minutes the Chinese were seen advancing 
against "A" Company HQ "in waves"; 2 RCHA 
11 
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fired "Mike" concentrations on top of the 
position, breaking up the Chinese advance, 19 
The Chinese attack slackened toward 
morning. Three air strikes were called on the 
Chinese forward positions as "A" Company's 
No.3 Platoon went out to re-occupy the positions 
abandoned in the early morning hours. An overly 
exuberant RCR Intelligence Officer estimated 
300 Chinese killed or wounded in return for 
one dead and eleven wounded Canadians, but 
there was no way of verifying that figure because 
the Chinese made great efforts to remove their 
dead from the battlefield. The next day, the figure 
for Chinese casualties was finalized as 18 killed, 
two wounded and one PW confirmed. 
The rest of 3 November was quiet on the 
Canadian front as the Chinese prepared to take 
on the 28th Brigade to the north of the 
Canadians. That attack began with heavy 
shelling in the early afternoon of 4 November, 
followed by an infantry assault on the King's Ov.rr1 
Scottish Borderers at about 1630 hours. Heavy 
fighting, some hand-to-hand, raged through the 
night with the KOSB suffering severe casualties 
and the loss of the western slopes of Hill 317 at 
midnight. 20 The Chinese attack was 
accompanied by "intense and well-coordinated" 
artillery fire. An estimated 20-30 SPs delivered 
one round every two seconds on the British 
bunkers and trench lines. 21 At about the same 
time, an eight-man Chinese wire-cutting party 
was spotted in the valley separating 25th and 
28th Brigades. It was driven off by "D" Company 
of 1 PPCLI. The Chinese attacks on the 28th 
Brigade continued through the night, their 
artillery destroying practically all the KOSB's 
line and signal equipment. The Patricias spotted 
Chinese infantry forming up in front of their 
positions shortly after first light and called for 
artillery fire, which drove the enemy off. 
The Patricias endured shelling and 
mortaring for the rest of 5 November; nightfall 
brought another infantry attack. At 1815 hours 
the Chinese mounted two assaults on "D" 
Company. The Chinese infantry were equipped 
for a prolonged stay. Each carried an 
entrenching tool, spare ammunition in pouches 
and bandoliers, and extra hand grenades. They 
were armed with rifles, burp guns and Russian-
pattern light machine guns, and brought rice, 
12 
tooth powder. cigarettes, an extra jacket, and 
North Korean and Chinese currency with them. 
The fighting raged at close quarters. Land 
lines were cut almost as soon as the Chinese 
barrage started. The battalion FOO radioed for 
the searchlights to be turned on to pinpoint the 
enemy so that he could call their positions to 
the field artillery. Canadian gunners, machine 
gunners and mortarmen worked feverishly to 
put a curtain of fire between "D" Company and 
the enemy and succeeded in driving the Chinese 
off. They returned under cover of a massive 
artillery barrage at 2020 hours and concentrated 
on 12 and 10 Platoons. No.10 Platoon fought to 
the last bullet, then withdrew down a crawl 
trench into the main company position, the 
Chinese hot on their heels. The 1 PPCLI war 
diarist summed up the action that followed: 
"Wave after wave of enemy charged at D coy's 
wire with bangalore torpedoes and small arms 
fire, to be beaten off by our small arms fire and 
grenades." 
At 2300 hours, the hills across from the 
Canadian positions erupted with a chain of 
massive explosions as bombs from a B-29 radar-
directed strike walked across the Chinese front. 
No one could tell how much damage the 
bombing had caused, but coming when it did, it 
was a definite morale booster for the beleaguered 
Canadians who now knew they could depend 
on air support even at night. Despite the 
bombing, the Chinese went at the Patricias one 
last time at 0130 hours, and again they targeted 
"D" Company. A massive concentration of 25-
pounder shells from brigade artillery and 155 
mm shells from the US Corps artillery was 
directed into the valley in front of "D" Company. 
Despite the barrage at least two companies of 
Chinese infantry moved up to attack 10 Platoon 
which had infiltrated back into its position 
during a lull in the fighting. The battalion's 81 
mm mortars were directed to within 50 metres 
of the Canadian wire and had a devastating effect 
on the Chinese. Those who managed to get 
through the wire were killed by small arms and 
grenades. Once again the fighting was done at 
close range until two red flares went up from 
the Chinese lines, signalling a withdrawal. 
In three attacks through the night, the 
Chinese had pushed the equivalent of a full 
6
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battalion at the green "D" Company of 1 PPCLL 
but "D" Company had held. The Canadians 
suffered three killed and 15 wounded. The 
Chinese had left 34 corpses within 50 yards of 
the wire and seven more in the minefield. It was 
impossible to say how many more had been 
killed because the Chinese almost never left their 
dead if they could help it, and had clearly carted 
many away. The 1 PPCLI war diarist chalked 
up the failure of the Chinese attack to defensive 
artillery and mortar fire. excellent 
communications between the forward positions 
and the rear batteries, the concertina wire, and 
"the mettle of the men of 10 Pl[atoon] in 
remaining in their slits to fight it out at close 
quarters with the enemy and the excellence of 
the leadership of the officers and NCOs in the 
company."22 
It is easy to discount the last of these 
observations. The war diary, after all, is written 
by the battalion intelligence officer and approved 
by the battalion CO. But "D" Company had done 
well in its first real battle and no doubt part of 
its steadfastness can be chalked up to intense 
training, regimental pride, and professionalism. 
1 PPCLI was part of Canada's professional army. 
It had begun conversion from an ordinary 
infantry battalion to Canada's first standing 
peacetime paratroop unit in the fall of 1948 at 
Rivers, Manitoba. Although it's first parachute 
drill, Exercise "Eagle'' held in August 1949, had 
been a mixed success due to inadequate 
numbers of transport aircraft, the battalion itself 
had done well. It had also received arctic warfare 
training and been part of Exercise "Sweetbriar" 
in the Yukon in January 1950.23 The CO of 1 
PPCLI, Lieutenant-Colonel N.G. Wilson-Smith, 
was a decorated veteran of World War II, having 
been wounded in action in Northwest Europe. 
In his recent comparative analysis of the 
performance of US Army and Marine Corps 
units during the fighting retreat from Chosin 
Reservoir in 1950. Faris R. Kirkland concluded: 
The differentiating factor was the senior 
commanders. The Marines succeeded in fighting 
their way out because their colonels and generals 
knew what to clo in field combat situations. The 
Army regiment was destroyed because its senior 
leaders had little experience of combat and field 
duty, and did not know what to do."'' 
If we substitute battalion and company 
commanders for colonels and generals, the same 
observation can be applied to the performance 
of "D" Company, 1 PPCLI, during the Chinese 
attacks of 4-5 November. A mix of war veterans 
and tough, seasoned troops, the PPCLI fought 
well. It was not the fighting quality of the men 
that was later to be questioned, but the 
outmoded defence doctrine they adhered to. 
That factor was not of their making, but the 
result of the general doctrinal unpreparedness 
and lack of originality in the Canadian army 
itself. 
Canadian Defensive Doctrine 
I n the late summer of 1953, Major W.H. Pope, who had commanded a rifle company with 
both 1 and 3 R22eR. analyzed the pattern of 
Chinese attacks that had started to develop in 
the fall of 1951 and offered his solution for a 
revised and more effective defence doctrine. Pope 
pointed out that the Chinese had developed a 
predictable pattern in their raids on the 
Canadian positions on the Jamestown Line. The 
sequence of Chinese moves and Canadian 
counter-moves which Pope discerned went 
something like this: 
First, the enemy increased his patrolling in 
front of the position to be raided. The Canadians 
would either counter with patrols of their own 
or cease patrolling and await events. When 
Canadian patrols were mounted, they were 
invariably too weak to accomplish much and, 
instead, were engaged and chased off by the 
Chinese who maintained a stronger presence in 
no-man's-land at night. The mere presence of 
these weak Canadian patrols hindered the 
defence of the main positions on the Jamestown 
Line, however, because heavy mortar and 
artillery fire could not be brought to bear on 
the Chinese forming-up positions for fear of 
hitting the Canadian patrol. If no patrols were 
sent, however, there was little warning before 
the Chinese hit the Canadian wire. 25 
Second, Chinese shelling would intensify on 
the Canadian positions in a classic World War 
One-era effort to neutralize the defenders by 
forcing them to keep their heads down. 
disorganize the defence, depress morale, and 
13 
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keep them bottled up in their defensive positions 
during daylight. The tactic worked well, as one 
PPCLI sergeant told Canadian war 
correspondent Bill Boss: 
The Communists are using much more artillery 
now and sometimes it gets hard to just sit and 
take it. My fellows are good, fairly new, and 
sometime they get jittery during the shelling, and 
if the Chinese come in and attack, they get excited 
during the grenade throwing. 2 " 
Not only did the Canadians get jittery, but 
they surrendered the initiative during daylight. 
And that was precisely when their overwhelming 
strength in field and medium artillery, heavy 
mortars, and, most important, tactical air power, 
gave them a distinct advantage over the 
Chinese."7 
In Korea the UN allies had complete control 
of the skies over the front; fighter bombers laden 
with napalm were available continually during 
the daylight hours. The system on the 
Commonwealth Division front seems to have 
been a compromise between those used by 21 
Army Group and 12 Army Group in Northwest 
Europe in 1944-45. Targets were first marked 
with smoke by artillery or tank fire. The FOO 
or company commander then passed the target 
coordinates in relation to the smoke burst to 
the artillery regiment Intelligence Officer at 
Brigade HQ. The IO then passed the information 
to the Tactical Air Command Patrol officer 
(TACP) sitting next to him in the 
communications van, who was in direct radio 
contact with the forward air controller flying 
above the battlefield in a "mosquito," usually a 
single-engine Harvard. It was the FAC's job to 
direct the incoming fighter bombers on to the 
target. The procedure was quite different from 
what the Canadians had learned in training. 
They had been taught to work with a TACP who 
observed the ground from the forwardmost 
infantry positions, not unlike a FOO. In their 
opinion, the system probably delivered close air 
support faster than it might have with a ground-
based observer, but not as accurately. 28 
Third, Commonwealth defensive localities 
were poorly laid out and weakly protected. 
Instead of clustering defensive positions on 
selected hilltops in such a manner that platoons 
covered platoons, and companies covered 
companies, defences were almost automatically 
14 
placed on every hilltop in the line. This was the 
Italian model, good for troops planning to move 
up against an enemy not planning to move back, 
but tempting to a habitual attacker. The single 
line of defensive hilltops not only thinned the 
defences, it also forced the very concept of 
defence into artificial and ineffective patterns 
that made enfilade very difficult. 
Fourth, the defensive localities were 
themselves poorly laid out with a single 
encircling company trench which, when 
beleaguered, offered its occupants little 
protection. Pope thought there ought to have 
been at least three such encirclements. each 
offering fire protection for the other two, and 
much less use of mines which made movement 
as difficult for the defenders as for the attackers. 
What all this amounted to was that the 
Chinese were able to seize the initiative, select 
the time and place for the attack, make up for 
whatever fire-power deficiencies they had by 
using the cover of darkness, and attack virtually 
at will. When they did attack, they were often 
through the wire and in to the trenches as soon 
as their shelling lifted. Then Canadian infantry, 
with their outmoded bolt-action rifles, were 
forced to deal at close quarters with Chinese in 
the trenches firing automatic weapons. or on 
the open ground throwing volleys of grenades 
down into the trenches. As Pope wrote: "Rifles 
at five paces at night, with or without bayonets 
fixed, give one no confidence against a burp 
gun."29 
Here was yet another deficiency the 
Canadian infantry had to overcome; its basic 
small arms were inadequate for the type of 
fighting they encountered in Korea. One report 
from the front marked the venerable Lee-Enfield 
.303 rifle as "almost useless ... except as a 
personal weapon for troops not manning the 
defensive positions, for example, troops in the 
echelons. "~lO The Sten gun, one Canadian officer 
declared, "was a cheap 'backs to the wall' 
weapon produced to meet an emergency 
situation, so let's put it away until we have our 
backs to the wall again. "~ll The net result was a 
mass, unofficial, self-rearming of the troops, 
usually with American M2 carbines. 3" 
Many of the deficiencies Pope would later 
emphasize in Canadian fighting doctrine 
8
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Korean combat scene with Royal 22e Regiment r!flemen and Bren gunner. 23 October 1951. 
emerged during Operation 'Toughy." This was 
a raid mounted against Chinese positions on 
Hill 166 on the night of 9th and lOth November 
by two platoons of "C" Company and the Scout 
Platoon of 2 R22eR. The raiders crossed their 
start line at 2100 hours; No.8 Platoon traversed 
a valley to move directly north on to the 
objective; No.7 Platoon attempted to move to 
the objective from the left. It was supposed to 
be a textbook fire and maneuver assault, but 
without any artillery or tank fire preparation. 
The fire plan was to be used only if the 
Canadians encountered opposition. This they 
did when No.8 Platoon came under automatic 
weapons fire and grenades about 15 minutes 
after crossing the start line. The platoon sought 
refuge in a crawl trench some 75 to 100 metres 
short of the objective, a knoll below the summit 
of Hill 166. Setting two of his sections up as a 
fire base, the platoon commander tried to get 
on to the objective with his third section moving 
around to the left. That did not work either, so 
the objective was plastered with heavy mortars 
and 25-pounders while the platoon assaulted 
the hilltop "firing from [the] hip, throwing 
grenades and yelling fiercely." That worked. 33 
To the left. No.7 Platoon ran into similar 
problems and also went to ground. The platoon 
commander sent two sections out to probe the 
approaches to Hill 166 but could find no clear 
path. He decided to go up the middle. His men 
rose up and charged, firing their guns and 
throwing their grenades until they reached their 
initial objective at about 0100 hours. The Scout 
Platoon, working around the far left of Hill 166, 
came under heavy automatic weapons fire at 
about 0122 hours and were forced to take cover. 
By this time, however No.8 Platoon was ready 
to go for the summit of Hill 166 and 2 RCHA 
began to lay on their fire plan. Mike targets were 
fired at the hilltop and at suspected Chinese 
mortar and machine gun positions, but No.8 
Platoon could still not get forward, even with 
this support. The danger now increased by the 
minute that all three platoons would be pinned 
down, or worse. One platoon commander 
reported by radio that Chinese infantry had 
infiltrated his platoon, and that his men and 
the enemy were all mixed up. This made it 
impossible for the Canadian tanks to "bring 
down tank fire on previously registered targets" 
because of the danger to the Canadian in fan try. :14 
Under these circumstances the CO, Lieutenant-
Colonel Jacques Dextraze, ordered a general 
withdrawal. The raiders were back in the 
forward defence positions by 0300 hours. Two 
men were missing, four wounded>35 
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The low casualties suffered in this raid do 
not mask its complete failure. Nothing of any 
value was accomplished. No prisoners were 
taken. No intelligence was gained. The Chinese 
could not have sustained many casualties nor 
suffered any real damage to their defensive 
positions. Canadian casualties were low only 
because the battalion CO could easily see that 
the raid was going nowhere and that his men 
might be trapped if he did not act quickly. 
What went wrong? There had been two few 
raiders. They had not used artillery, mortars, 
or close air support to mask their approach and 
neutralize the defenders because they chose to 
attack at night. When the artillery did get into 
the act, it fired according to pre-determined 
plans but darkness make the selection of new 
targets of opportunity almost impossible. The 
tanks could not use direct fire for fear of killing 
Canadians. "Toughy" was a classic example of 
how not to play to one's strengths, and yet it 
was only one of a pattern, as Pope later pointed 
out. 
The Defence ofHill227 
"D" Company 2 R22eR 
~ough the Canadians were not heavily tested 
.l again for some weeks, casualties in the line 
mounted on a daily basis. Chinese sniping, 
occasional sudden barrages, and patrolling took 
their toll and few days went by when a man was 
not killed. By the third week in November the 
toll of dead for the month reached 17. But the 
Canadian losses were small compared to those 
suffered by the 28th Brigade which held that 
portion of the line from the Canadian positions 
to the divisional boundary with the 1st Cavalry 
Division. On 17 November, the Chinese pushed 
1 King's Shropshire Light Infantry off of Hill 227. 
In the words of the 25th Brigade war diarist: 
this was a serious turn of events as il exposed 
[a) good deal of the Patricia's right Ilank 
previously dominated by the two platoons and 
company headquarters of A coy [of 1 KSLIJ on 
top ofthe feature.cw 
For three days, the hill changed hands as British 
counterattacked and Chinese responded. On 20 
November, it was permanently lost to the Reds. 
16 
The loss of Hill 22 7 created a salient in the 
Commonwealth Division's lines with potentially 
disastrous consequences even though Hill355, 
1.5 kilometres to the east. dominated the 227 
feature. The existence of the salient was 
particularly dangerous because of the weakened 
condition of the 28th Brigade, which had few 
prospects for reinforcement. The division was 
already covering too much front with too few 
men and to partially remedy the situation 
Cassels ordered a repositioning of the brigades 
to enable him to take the 28th Brigade out of 
the line and shorten his front from 19,000 to 
15,000 metres. The 25th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade was moved to the right to occupy the 
saddle formed by the west slope of Hill 355 and 
the foot of Hill 227. 37 Then the 28th Brigade 
was relieved by the US 7th Infantry Regiment of 
the 3rd US Infantry Division (which had replaced 
the 1st Cavalry) which thereby inherited the 
summit of Hill 355. 08 All three Canadian 
battalions were in the line with all four of their 
rifle companies; the RCR on the left, the PPCLI 
in the center, and the R22eR on the right- the 
last holding a section of line formerly occupied 
by most of a brigade.:19 
The R22eR - the "Van Doos" - was 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques 
Dextraze, who had been decorated while leading 
Les Fusiliers Mont Royal for much of the 
Northwest Europe campaign. By his own 
admission, Dextraze was a "meddler" who took 
a "hands-on" approach to battalion command, 
even in battle. 40 He began to prepare his 
battalion for the move into the 227/355 area at 
an "0" Group on 19 November. He told his 
company commanders that he would retain 
control of, and assign fire tasks to, the 60 mm 
mortars, the 75 mm recoilless rifles, and the 
heavy machine guns. He urged a thorough check 
of all equipment even to the state of the Bren 
gun magazines. He demanded a tightening up 
of discipline with daily inspections, Tests of 
Elementary Training and range practise. He 
insisted on strict five yard intervals between men 
in the line, no one on forward slopes, and 
continuous observation of enemy positions. 
Above all, in the event of attack, there was to be 
"NO withdrawal, No platoons overrun and No 
panic. All would be expected to perform their 
duty in a typical "VAN DOOS" manner."41 
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The Van Doos began to move into their new 
positions on the night of 21 November after a 
hot Thanksgiving dinner of turkey and all the 
trimmings, courtesy of the US Army. Their task 
was to occupy and hold the saddle between Hills 
355 and 227. The battalion took over a 
triangular-shaped defensive position formerly 
occupied by 1 KSLI. Dextraze placed "D" 
Company on a spur that ran north-south across 
the saddle at the front of the triangle. "A" 
Company was sited about 500 metres to the 
south, at the end of the spur, in the middle of 
the triangle. "B" Company took the bottom left 
corner of the triangle, about 1200 metres, and 
across a ravine, from "A" Company. "C" Company 
was positioned about 1100 metres to the east 
of "B" Company, with the same ravine between 
it and "A" Company:12 
These positions were inadequate for effective 
defence. The Officer Commanding "D" Company, 
Major Real Liboiron, later recalled: 
The K.S.L.l. had good positions until they lost 
Hill 227 and lhen their platoons were not 
mutually supporting and were much too 
crowded. My No.ll Platoon. for example, was 
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holding a position previously held by a K.S.L.I. 
section. The K.S.L.l. had also constructed "hol-
D stands .. (slit trenches and bunkers built with 
roofs several feet above lhe ground) which were 
perfect targets for SPs and were responsible for 
many casualties. I intended lo readjust the 
positions at the first opportunity but as events 
turned oul there was never the lime.''" 
What was true of the "D" Company positions 
was also true of the entire battalion. Though "A'' 
and "D" Companies could offer supporting fire 
to each other, both were too separated from "B" 
and "C" Companies to help in their defence. 
Given the terrain and the short time which 
elapsed between moving into the line and coming 
under attack, it is hard to see what else Dextraze 
might have done to improve his position. 
The battalion was in place by 0630 hours 
on 22 November and quickly got to work 
improving the defences. Dextraze himself 
supervised the laying of additional wire and 
mines, and the siting of the heavy .50 Browning 
machine guns, the lighter .30 Brownings, and 
even the .303 Brens. By mid-afternoon his HQ 
was functioning with radio and land-line 
17 
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communication to the rifle companies and to 
Brigade HQ to the rear. Not long after, Chinese 
shells began to rumble in from across the valley. 
The shelling grew more intense by the minute 
and was soon joined by heavy calibre rocket fire. 
The Chinese concentrated on "D" Company and 
on the American positions atop 355. One Van 
Doo private was blown to bits when a shell 
exploded in his slit trench. Others were wounded 
by flying shards of steel or by the dirt, rocks, 
and pieces of smashed bunker which rained 
down on them. The concertina wire in front of 
the company positions was shredded. Telephone 
lines were cut. The minefield was pulverized. 
As night fell and the cold penetrated into the 
very bones of the Canadian infantrymen the 
shelling continued. It started to snow heavily, 
the first real snow of the winter, 44 but the Chinese 
did not come and when morning dawned on the 
23rd November, the shelling slackened. 
The men of "D" Company used the hiatus to 
repair damage and lay new telephone lines. In 
mid-morning a Chinese scout was captured near 
the Pioneer Platoon wire; minutes later shells 
began to fall once again, this time on "D" 
Company's left flank. The shelling forced the 
men to ground. At 1350 hours an observation 
plane reported at least a company of Chinese 
infantry advancing from the northwest, about a 
kilometre away, and called down an artillery 
concentration. In response the Canadian and 
New Zealand batteries plastered the paddy land 
in a valley to the left and front of "D" Company. 
At 1620 hours Chinese rocket and shellfire 
began to strike the summit ofHill355; less than 
ten minutes later. approximately two companies 
of Chinese infantry hit the "D" Company wire. 
The fighting was close, intense, and desperate. 
The Canadian infantry threw grenades, worked 
the bolts of their Lee-Enfield rifles at a fevered 
pace, and fired clip after clip of Bren gun and 
belt after belt of Browning machine gun 
ammunition at the onrushing Chinese. One Van 
Doo section broke but the platoon commander 
led them back into position. On Hill 355, Easy, 
Fox and George Companies of the US 7th 
infantry were under attack from an entire 
Chinese battalion. At 1735 hours word reached 
Dextraze that US infantry from 355 were arriving 
in the "A" Company area; the Americans had 
been forced off Hill 355. 45 This was a "very grave 
and serious situation." according to the 25th 
18 
Brigade war diarist. Hill 355 was not only the 
highest position in the line, it also dominated 
the lateral road running through the American 
sector. The Canadian right flank was now 
completely open and the Chinese could look 
down into the Van Doos' positions from their 
US-dug trenches and bunkers. 
The Chinese had taken 355 but they had 
not taken the saddle; they attacked the Van Doos 
positions with renewed fury. At one point a single 
Canadian platoon was beleaguered by an 
estimated 400 Chinese soldiers. At Brigade HQ, 
the Canadian tanks were ordered forward to 
support the Canadian infantry. At his own HQ, 
Dextraze worked the radio, ordering his 
company commanders to hold fast and directing 
mortar, tank, and artillery fire. sometimes 
bringing it down virtually on the "D" Company 
wire. Four Chinese attacks were beaten off by 
morning; as the Canadians stubbornly defended 
their ridge, a US counterattack retook most of 
Hill 355. 
The Chinese attackers melted away at first 
light on the 24th, but intermittent shelling 
continued. Dextraze ordered a platoon counter-
attack toward Hill227. The advancing unit met 
little resistance and gained the summit of Hill 
227 which it held until withdrawn in the face of 
another massing of Chinese infantry at about 
1700 hours. Brigade and divisional artillery 
rained down on the Chinese forming up 
positions but failed to stop a renewed assault 
on the Van Doos' "D" Company. The Chinese 
came from all directions despite a hail of tank, 
mortar and artillery fire. "D" Company's left 
forward platoon collapsed back into the main 
company positions but the company itself held 
fast. Just before midnight, the Van Doos' Scout 
Platoon edged forward to retake the lost platoon 
position. They did, but were then strongly 
attacked by at least two Chinese companies and 
were forced to pull back to take cover in several 
shell holes. Dextraze then called down heavy 
mortar fire on the Chinese attackers. At about 
the same time. a forced withdrawal or us troops 
on the western slope of 355 once again exposed 
the Canadian right flank until 355 was retaken 
a second time before first light on the 25th. 
In the morning, the Van Doos' Scout Platoon 
once more made its way back to the lost platoon 
position to the left front of "D" Company. Up on 
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Hill 355 the Americans swept the entire feature 
from east to west, ferreting out any remaining 
Chinese, There were no more Chinese attacks 
on the Van Doos until dark when a small probe 
was sent against "D" Company from the direction 
ofHill227. The Chinese were met with a volley 
of artillery fire and withdrew. That was the end 
of "D" Company's ordeal. Just before dawn on 
26 November, Dextraze ordered "D" Company 
relieved by "B" Company. In the words of the 
brigade war diarist, "the troops of D Coy ... had 
reached the limits of their endurance. They had 
been exposed to the snow, the cold of the day, 
the freezing nights, and had had no sleep since 
the evening of the 21st. "46 They had also received 
only minimal help from the other three 
companies of the battalion because the terrain, 
the woefully inadequate siting of the positions 
by 1 KSLI, and lack of time for correction of the 
situation, had not allowed it. 
In the four days between 22 and 26 
November, the Van Doos lost 16 men killed -
nine from "D" Company alone - 44 wounded, 
and three missing and presumed dead after a 
direct hit by a Chinese shell on a Van Doos 
bunker. 47 Division estimated 2,000 Chinese 
dead in the operations around Hills 227 and 
355, but only 742 enemy dead were actually 
counted. '18 The Division noted building defence-
in-depth as one major lesson from the attacks, 
but little was done to improve defensive 
positions along the division front in the months, 
and indeed the years, to come. 
The Canadians had fought well, as individual 
soldiers and as field grade officers. The 84 hour 
travail of "D" Company, 2 R22eR, was one of the 
finest defensive actions in the history of the 
Canadian army. But the magnificent effort of 
both officers and men was undermined by poor 
doctrine. and inadequate defensive training. 
Here was a Canadian "failure in high 
command,"4 D that was not to be remedied for 
the duration of the Korean war. But that 
Canadian failure was linked directly to the 
political decision to limit offensive operations 
on the UN front and go over to the defensive 
and the subsequent military failure to 
accommodate defensive doctrine on the line to 
the new political reality. 
On the afternoon of 26 November 1951 two 
of the last Chinese shells fired in that month's 
20 
struggles along the Canadian front on the 
Jamestown Line fell on one of the 2 R22eR 
positions. One man was buried. When he was 
finally dug out, "there was so little left of him he 
looked as if he had been pulverized by the force 
of the explosion," his platoon commander, 
Lieutenant Gerard Belanger, wrote in a letter 
home. That letter mirrored Belanger's dark 
mood: 
If we continue to lose men at this rate. the 
Battalion will be decimated in a few weeks ... The 
snow covered the ground today: there are snow 
flurries this evening: it's quite a sight to see. 
especially when you're living in a hole without a 
heater to keep you warm. We're living like rats 
and we'll probably die like rats ... It is now 0625: 
the day is just breaking and I haven't slept since 
yesterday morning. So much for the glorious life 
of a platoon commander."' 
These were the thoughts of one Canadian 
soldier fighting the defensive battle along the 
Jamestown Line in far away, frozen. Korea in 
November of 1951. 
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